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CauCaSuS CriSiS: imPliCatioNS 
aNd oPtioNS for the WeSt
following russia’s military intervention in Georgia and its recognition, in contravention of 
international law, of South ossetian and abkhazian independence, the Caucasus has returned 
to the focus of security policy attention. Georgia’s attempt to retake South ossetia by military 
force and the demonstration of russian power have called into question some important 
parameters of the european security framework. the unstable situation in the Caucasus also 
threatens to undermine european efforts to reduce its energy-policy dependency on russia. 
the West’s options are limited, since an isolation of moscow would be counter-productive.
Current EU President Sarkozy and Russian President Medvedev in Mosocw, 12 August 2008
from a security-policy point of view, the 
conflict over Georgia’s territorial integrity 
is important for three reasons: first of all, 
the attack by Georgian troops against the 
breakaway republic of South ossetia on 
7 august 2008 demonstrated that ethnic 
tensions and secessionist tendencies in 
the multiethnic Caucasus region continue 
to constitute a major potential source of 
tensions. 
Secondly, with its military action against 
Georgia, russia has demonstrated that it is 
prepared to enforce its claim to influence 
in the Caucasus region by all means neces-
sary. the ejection of Georgian forces from 
South ossetia and the advance of russian 
troops deep into the heart of Georgia’s 
territory were linked to the overarching 
goal of inflicting a painful defeat on the 
uS-trained Georgian armed forces and to 
destabilize the pro-american government 
of Georgia. at the same time, moscow sig-
naled its neighbors and the Western coun-
tries that it is determined and able to act 
as a regional hegemon. the russian gov-
ernment underscored its rejection of West-
ern interference through its unilateral re-
cognition of South ossetia and abkhazia 
as independent states on 26 august 2008. 
third, the Georgian crisis and the harsh 
russian action are likely to have secu-
rity-political consequences far beyond the 
Caucasus. Nato and the eu are forced to 
reconsider their relations with russia in 
the context of their security relations with 
the countries of the post-Soviet space. fur-
thermore, the crisis jeopardizes european 
efforts to reduce their dependency on rus-
sian energy deliveries, as the only pipelines 
carrying Caspian oil and gas westwards 
without transiting russian territory run 
through Georgia.
Caucasian conflict landscapes
in view of the problems in afghanistan 
and the middle east, the Caucasian con-
flict hotspots had temporarily disappeared 
from the security policy radar of the West 
in recent years. it was occasionally forgot-
ten that there have been several major 
conflict zones in this region since the dis-
solution of the Soviet union:
in the Northern Caucasus, which is part of 
russia’s territory, moscow intervened twice 
militarily against secessionist Chechnya. 
the russian human rights organization 
memorial estimates that the two Chechen 
wars (1994–6, 1999–2005) killed around 
75,000 civilian victims. more than 10,000 
russian soldiers and probably at least as 
many Chechen fighters lost their lives. the 
situation remains tense even today. almost 
every day, there are armed clashes between 
Chechen rebels and state security forces. 
there is also a continuing conflict between 
Chechen clans. furthermore, the conflict is 
no longer restricted to Chechnya, but has 
also gripped dagestan and ingushetia. 
the Northern Caucasian neighbors in-
gushetia and North ossetia are also 
embroiled in a tense standoff. in 1992, a 
short but intense war broke out over the 
so-called Prigorodny district, a contended 
territory that is claimed by both republics. 
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the war cost the lives of more than 500 
people. thousands of ingush people were 
displaced. the territorial question remains 
unresolved until today. a new outbreak of 
violence is not altogether unlikely.
in the Southern Caucasus states of arme-
nia, azerbaijan, and Georgia, three major 
crisis zones can be identified. there is a 
conflict between azerbaijan and armeni-
ans over Nagorno Karabakh, which is legal-
ly part of azerbaijan, but is populated pre-
dominantly by armenians. in the bloody 
war of secession between 1992 and 1994, 
more than 20,000 people died and around 
one million people were displaced. ever 
since, the status of Nagorno Karabakh has 
remained unresolved. 
in Georgia, the central state waged two 
wars against minorities immediately af-
ter the dissolution of the Soviet union 
– against the South ossetians (1991–2) and 
against the abkhaz (1992–3). the abkhaz-
Georgian conflict was particularly bloody, 
with terrible massacres of the Georgian 
population and the expulsion of around 
250,000 refugees. the imprudent attack 
by Georgian troops against South ossetia 
and the russian military intervention in 
the summer of 2008 have triggered new 
refugee flows and further escalated the 
humanitarian crisis.
The geopolitical significance of 
the Caucasus
due to ethnic overlap, the conflict zones in 
the multiethnic assembly of states in the 
Caucasus are closely intertwined. the mas-
sive arms race that has been underway in 
this region for years has further raised the 
potential for escalation. russia has sta-
tioned large numbers of troops from the 
ministry of defense as well as other secu-
rity structures in the Northern Caucasus 
and periodically carries out large-scale 
maneuvers there. the three Southern Cau-
casus states have drastically raised their 
defense expenditures in the past years: 
Georgia’s spending on its armed forces 
rose more than tenfold between 2002 
and 2007, while azerbaijan has been able 
to massively expand its defense budget 
not least because of its additional revenue 
from oil exports. 
in particular, the conflicts in the Southern 
Caucasus have an explosive potential on 
the international stage, since they coincide 
with geostrategic rivalries. the main center 
of gravity is the struggle for influence be-
tween russia and the uS (and Nato). how-
ever, the eu, too, is expanding its sphere of 
influence eastwards, in a move that for 
now manifests itself mainly in the expan-
sion of trade relations. furthermore, turkey 
and iran as immediate neighbors have con-
crete interests in the region, although they 
have so far remained politically reticent.
as the dominant military power, russia 
plays an important role in the crisis zones 
of the Southern Caucasus. its relations are 
closest with South ossetia and abkhazia, 
where russia has established itself as the 
de facto protector of the abkhaz and South 
ossetian people by deploying peacekeep-
ers after the ceasefire agreements at the 
beginning of the 1990s. moscow has since 
maintained close economic and political 
relations with the breakaway territories 
and has most likely also supported them 
with military aid for many years. While the 
armenians of Karabakh enjoy significant 
support from armenia, russia also plays a 
key role here thanks to its military alliance 
with Yerevan.
the uS, in turn, has since 1991 been sup-
porting several initiatives that aim at re-
moving the former Soviet republics from 
the russian sphere of influence. from the 
onset, Washington has been a strong advo-
cate of building the pipeline from Baku via 
tbilisi to Ceyhan in turkey (the BtC pipe-
line), has supported regional alliances of 
former Soviet states such as Guam (Geor-
gia, ukraine, azerbaijan, and moldova), and 
has offered military aid to all three states 
of the Southern Caucasus. its security 
policy partnership with Georgia has been 
particularly close. With its openhanded 
financial aid and training programs, the uS 
has contributed significantly to the mod-
ernization of the Georgian armed forces.
the rivalry between Washington and mos-
cow in the Caucasus became evident just 
before the Georgian crisis broke out in mid-
July 2008, when both sides carried out si-
multaneous military maneuvers. for three 
weeks, more than 1,000 uS troops trained 
near tbilisi together with several hundred 
Georgians to enhance military readiness. 
this annual exercise was also attended 
by units from azerbaijan, armenia, and 
ukraine. russia, in turn, carried out a ma-
jor military exercise with more than 8,000 
troops in the Northern Caucasus near the 
Georgian border. a few weeks later, these 
same russian forces were deployed deep 
in the heartland of Georgia. from the rus-
sian point of view, the russian–Georgian 
war of august 2008 was the first proxy 
war between russia and the uS since the 
dissolution of the Soviet union in 1991.
The supra-regional dimension
russia’s actions in the Georgia crisis will 
not only intensify the struggle for influ-
ence in the Caucasus, but is also bound 
to have repercussions well beyond the 
region. moscow’s unmistakable warning 
to the West not to extend its influence in 
the post-Soviet space any further relates in 
particular to the conflict over ukraine’s for-
eign and security policy alignment. Nato 
membership for Kiev would be unaccept-
able from the russian point of view, since 
the Western alliance would thus advance 
to the borders of russia itself in a region 
of key geostrategic importance for russia. 
furthermore, ukraine, with its significant 
russian minority population, is regarded 
by many russians as the cradle of russian 
civilization. 
Well beyond ukraine, the Georgian crisis 
has raised apprehensions in the former 
area of Soviet influence that moscow 
might try once more to pursue its inter-
ests by military means. the concomitant 
desire for stronger links with the West has, 
for example, manifested itself in Poland’s 
surprisingly rapid agreement to station 
uS missiles. from the West’s point of view, 
however, the question is whether it should 
and can afford to accept an escalation of 
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Military expenditures in the Southern Caucasus ( million US$)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Georgia
US$ 49.3 57.7 80.6 214 362 592
% GDP 1.0 1.1 1.4 3.3 5.2
Armenia
US$ 90.5 104 115 141 157 194
% GDP 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8
Azerbaijan
US$ 172 215 260 305 625 667
% GDP 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.3 3.6
Source: sipri
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tensions with russia, which would be in- 
evitable should the euro-atlantic secu-
rity institutions be expanded further east-
wards once more.
it remains to be seen how relations be-
tween the West and russia will develop. 
Currently, cooperation in security policy 
and economic matters, which – like Nato 
and eu enlargement – has become an im-
portant parameter of the european secu-
rity system, is being questioned by both 
sides. however, the power brokers in mos-
cow most likely understand that they have 
overstepped the mark and become iso-
lated both within the uN and among rus-
sia’s supposed allies in the Shanghai Co-
operation organization to an extent that 
is contrary to russia’s own interests and in 
particular to the goal of gaining greater in-
fluence in its neighborhood. 
Energy concerns
for europe in particular, the Georgia cri-
sis also has implications in terms of en-
ergy policy. the longstanding efforts of 
the West to create a safe east-West energy 
corridor circumventing russian territory 
have suffered a serious setback. russia did 
take care during the war not to damage 
any elements of the pipeline infrastruc-
ture, since that would have damaged its 
reputation among the Caspian energy 
producers. however, the russian air force 
bombed Georgian harbors and infrastruc-
ture elements, at which point the pipeline 
operators switched off the entire pipeline 
network within Georgia. 
due to the unstable situation in Georgia, 
europeans should ask themselves whether 
it makes sense to expand the capacities 
for oil and gas transport through Georgia. 
the situation is particularly difficult in 
the case of gas, which unlike oil cannot be 
transported by sea in barrels, but depends 
heavily on the presence of a pipeline infra-
structure. turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
the two most important gas exporters in 
Central asia, will have to consider carefully 
whether they choose to use the unsafe 
route via the Caspian and through Georgia 
in the future, which will bring them into 
conflict with russian interests. the alter-
native of continuing to sell their energy 
at a good price to russia, and in the future 
increasingly also to China, is likely to have 
become more attractive since the Geor-
gian crisis. Since azerbaijan alone does 
not produce sufficient gas for the planned 
Nabucco pipeline, this european showcase 
energy project is increasingly in jeopardy 
(cf. CSS analysis 36). thus, the eu’s pros-
pects of significantly reducing its energy 
policy dependency on russia through 
direct access to the Caspian energy re-
sources are also dwindling.
Limited options for the West
the West has rightly criticized russia’s 
actions in Georgia. the matter of an appro-
priate response by the West remains con-
troversial, however. at this point, a strategy 
of isolating moscow does not seem pro- 
mising. that would hardly convince mos-
cow to give in, but would strengthen 
those forces within russia that have long 
been spoiling for a confrontational policy 
towards the West. also, russia’s policies 
towards its neighbors would only harden 
further. in order to secure the stability of 
europe and its energy supplies as well as 
a solution for international security chal-
lenges such as the iranian nuclear pro-
gram, the West continues to depend on 
cooperation with moscow. Conversely, in 
view of its highly fragile power base rest-
ing on high energy prices, russia should 
have no interest in a further escalation of 
tensions. Selective cooperation is indispen-
sable for both sides.
it is important that the countries of the 
West enhance their efforts to seek for a 
solution to the Caucasus conflicts. While 
russia would hardly accept mediation ef-
forts in the crisis zones of the Northern 
Caucasus, the West can and must play 
a more active role in all conflicts of the 
Southern Caucasus. in the case of Geor-
gia, the West’s options are currently lim-
ited against the background of the strong 
russian position. as russia’s most impor-
tant trade partner, the eu is positioned 
best to exert pressure on russia. in par-
ticular, the europeans should urge russia 
to work towards the initiation of a dialog 
between the conflict parties. this dialog 
should take place under international su-
pervision and deal with questions such as 
the return of refugees, the protection of 
minorities, and aid in the reconstruction 
of destroyed residential areas and infra-
structure. 
a hasty integration of post-Soviet states 
into the euro-atlantic security institutions 
should be avoided. Certainly, Nato must 
not raise false hopes in these countries, as 
that could lead the governments in ques-
tion to misjudge their security situation, 
as was the case in Georgia. any expansion 
of partnerships with russia’s neighbors 
should be conducted, as far as possible, in 
parallel with the normalization of relations 
with moscow.
finally, europe should not write off the 
Caspian energy option too soon, since that 
would amount to a de facto recognition of 
russia’s geo-economic preeminence. the 
eu should signal russia unequivocally in 
direct negotiations that the Caspian re-
gion must remain open to the trade in oil 
and gas. at the same time, the West can-
not avoid dealing with the issue of how 
pipelines in crisis zones can be protected 
more efficiently.
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